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TOWARDS FAIRLY APPORTIONING SALE PROCEEDS IN A 
COLLECTIVE SALE OF STRATA PROPERTY 
 
 
EDWARD SW TI* 
 
Cake-cutting is a longstanding metaphor for ‘a wide range of real-
world problems that involve’ the division of anything of value.1 
Unsurprisingly, where owners of a strata scheme wish to end the 
strata scheme and collectively sell their development, one of the most 
contentious issues may be the apportionment of sale proceeds.2 In 
Singapore, this problem is compounded in mixed developments which 
have both commercial and residential elements as well as in 
developments with different sized units, often with disproportionate 
strata share values; even differing facings and the state of one’s unit 
may attract disenchantment when trying to apportion proceeds. This 
article critically analyses how New South Wales (‘NSW’) and 
Singapore allocate proceeds pursuant to a collective sale of strata 
property. In this respect, the Strata Schemes Development Act 2015 
(NSW) and Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) are 
significantly clearer than Singapore’s Land Titles (Strata) Act 
(Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) as the latter does not prescribe any 
statutory formula for apportionment. In examining the jurisprudence 
and respective strata frameworks, this article proposes how proceeds 
in a collective sale could be more fairly apportioned. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Under a strata scheme, each strata owner is the registered proprietor of their 
own unit and equitable tenant-in-common3 of the land on which the building is 
constructed. Strata unit owners thus hold a form of ‘dualistic’ ownership.4 From a 
legal perspective, the ingeniousness of strata was in the grant of a separate Torrens 
 
*  PhD (Cantab), MRICS. Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I am grateful to 
the anonymous reviewers for their discerning comments. edwardti@smu.edu.sg.   
1  Erica Klarreich, ‘The Mathematics of Cake Cutting’, Scientific American (online, 13 October 2016) 
<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-mathematics-of-cake-cutting/>.  
2  Loo-Lee Sim, Sau-Kim Lum and Lai Choo Malone-Lee, ‘Property Rights, Collective Sales and 
Government Intervention: Averting a Tragedy of the Anticommons’ (2002) 26(4) Habitat International 
457, 462. 
3  Carre v Owners Corporation – Strata Plan No 53020 (2003) 58 NSWLR 302, 310–11 [28]–[29] (Barrett 
J). 
4  Martti Lujanen, ‘Legal Challenges in Ensuring Regular Maintenance and Repairs of Owner-Occupied 
Apartment Blocks’ (2010) 2(2) International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 178, 179. 
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certificate of title for each unit – this ‘facilitate[d] mortgage lending against 
apartment dwellings’, the ‘original rationale’ for strata legislation.5 Partition of 
land by strata was first conceived in Victoria in 1960 and New South Wales 
(‘NSW’) in 1961; it was quickly adopted by the rest of Australia shortly after.6 In 
particular, the influence of NSW’s strata legislation has been ‘immense’7 and has 
proved an influential export, being rapidly adopted in many other jurisdictions, 
including Singapore in 1967, just two years after her independence. Strata law is 
no doubt profoundly impactful. In Australia, 25% of Sydneysiders live in strata 
title properties, and it ‘is estimated that by 2040 half of Sydney’s residential 
accommodation will be strata titled’.8 In absolute terms, this translates to more than 
1 million people in Sydney living in strata or community title scheme properties, 
and ‘both the number and the proportion are only going to increase’.9 In Singapore, 
the proportion is also very significant – the most recent data shows that some 16% 
of residents stay in strata schemes.10    
Although ‘[a]llowing a strata development to be terminated and sold via 
anything less than unanimous consent’ has been said to be ‘controversial’,11 
numerous jurisdictions permit a supermajority of unit owners (75% upwards) to 
have a strata scheme terminated and the land sold for redevelopment. While the 
pioneer in the development of the world’s first strata laws, NSW has only fairly 
recently legislated12 for a collective sale of a strata development by special 
majority. NSW was the second Australian state to provide for this; the Northern 
Territory (‘NT’) has permitted strata termination by a special majority vote since 
2008.13 Western Australia has considered the matter since 201414 but has yet to 
provide for the enabling legislation. Queensland appears still undecided.15 
Singapore has enabled the collective sale of a strata development via an 80% or 
 
5  Hazel Easthope and Bill Randolph, ‘Collective Responsibility in Strata Apartments’ in Erika Altmann 
and Michelle Gabriel (eds), Multi-Owned Property in the Asia-Pacific Region: Rights, Restrictions and 
Responsibilities (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 177, 178. 
6  Brendan Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law (Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2017) 951–2.  
7  Justice Mark Leeming, ‘Launch of “Strata Title Property Rights: Private Governance of Multi-Owned 
Properties” by Cathy Sherry’ (Speech, University of New South Wales, 2 August 2017) 3 
<http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/2017%20Speeches/Lee
ming_20170802.pdf>. 
8   New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 October 2015, 4305 (Victor 
Dominello).  
9  Leeming (n 7) 1.   
10  ‘Households’, Department of Statistics Singapore (Web Page, 20 February 2020) 
<https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/households/households/latest-data>.  
11  Edward SW Ti, ‘Collective Best Interests in Strata Collective Sales’ (2019) 93(12) Australian Law 
Journal 1025, 1026. 
12  Following a spirited debate in the NSW Lower House (with considerable opposition by Labor and the 
Greens), the Strata Schemes Development Act 2015 (NSW) (‘SSD Act’) came into force on 30 November 
2016. 
13  The Termination of Units Plans and Unit Title Schemes Act 2014 (NT) requires consensus of between 
80–95% of owners by strata share, depending on the age of the building (minimum 15-years): at s 4 
(definition of ‘required percentage’).  
14  Landgate, ‘Strata Titles Act Reform’ (Consultation Paper, October 2014). 
15  Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, ‘Queensland Government Property Law Review: Body 
Corporate Governance Issues’ (Options Paper, Queensland University of Technology Law, 15 December 
2014). 
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90% majority16 since 1999, and in doing so followed in the footsteps of several 
other jurisdictions. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario (80%), British 
Columbia (75%), Hawaii (80%) and Hong Kong (80% or 90%) all predated 
Singapore in allowing a strata collective sale by supermajorities.17 Dubai (75%),18 
Japan (80%)19 and New Zealand (75%)20 now also permit strata developments to 
be sold by supermajorities.  
It is apposite to briefly outline how collective sales are administered in NSW 
and Singapore. Under NSW law, a strata renewal proposal (suggesting either a 
collective sale or redevelopment) must first be presented21 to the Strata Committee, 
which then decides whether to present the proposal to the Owners Corporation at 
a general meeting for further consideration. Section 158(2) of the Strata Schemes 
Development Act 2015 (NSW) (‘SSD Act’) nevertheless provides for the convening 
of a general meeting if at least 25% of owners by strata share value have requested 
for the proposal to be considered, regardless of the view of the Strata Committee. 
The purpose of the general meeting is to determine whether the Owners 
Corporation considers the strata renewal proposal warrants investigation by 
another committee called the Strata Renewal Committee (‘SRC’);22 at the general 
meeting, a simple majority determines whether an SRC is established.23 The SRC 
is tasked to translate the strata renewal proposal into a strata renewal plan and it is 
the strata renewal plan which gets put to the vote by the Owner’s Corporation.24 
The renewal plan that has to be prepared by the SRC is required to be 
comprehensive,25 and in respect of a collective sale, cannot recommend that any 
strata owner receive less than what they would theoretically have obtained under 
the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) ie, fair market 
value. At least 75% of the strata owners must support the collective sale or 
development for the plan to take place. Once the requisite majority of strata owners 
support the collective sale, an application to dissolve the strata scheme is made to 
 
16  Buildings younger than 10 years old require a 90% majority while buildings older than 10 years require 
an 80% majority: Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, 2009 rev ed) ss 84A(1)(a)–(b). 
17  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (31 July 1998), vol 69 at col 602, 
<https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=31-07-1998> (accessed 7 April 2020) (Ho Peng Kee, 
Minister of State for Law) (‘Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 31 
July 1998’). 
18  Strata Title Law (Dubai International Financial Centre) Law No 5 of 2007, sch 2 cl 2 (definition of 
‘special resolution’). 
19  Act on Building Unit Ownership (Japan) Act No 69 of 1962, art 62(1):  
A resolution to the effect that the building will be demolished, and a new building will be constructed on 
the grounds of the building to be demolished or on part of its land, or on the land that includes the whole 
or part of the grounds of the building to be demolished (hereinafter such resolution shall be referred to as 
the “resolution to reconstruct”) may be adopted at a meeting by at least a four fifths majority of the unit 
owners and at least a four-fifths majority of the votes. 
20  Unit Titles Act 2010 (NZ) s 192(a).  
21  The person making this written proposal need not be an owner of a strata lot, ie a developer: SSD Act 
2015 (NSW) s 156(1). 
22  Ibid s 160(1). 
23  Ibid s 158(3). 
24  Ibid s 164. 
25  It must include among others, the purchaser/developer (if known), the proposed/reserve price, timelines 
for completion and vacant possession, planning approvals and the nature of the proposal: ibid s 170.  
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the Registrar-General26 and a petition to the Land and Environment Court of NSW 
to terminate the strata scheme is made.27 The Court has the ultimate power to 
approve the renewal proposal on grounds that the proposal is ‘just and equitable in 
all the circumstances’.28    
In Singapore, a two-step process is needed to commence a collective sale. At 
the first stage, at least 20% by share value or 25% by number of strata owners seek 
an extraordinary general meeting for the purposes of constituting a collective sale 
committee.29 At the second stage, the convened meeting needs at least 30% by 
share value of the strata owners to form the requisite quorum.30 If quorum is met, 
a simple majority of attendees may elect from amongst themselves a sales 
committee numbering from 3 to 14 persons.31 It is the Collective Sale Committee 
(‘CSC’) distinct from the Management Council32 that administers the collective 
sale. Section 84A(1) of the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 
2009) states that the requisite majority of strata owners (80% or 90%) makes an 
application for the sale of the whole strata property in an agreement that ‘specifies 
the proposed method of distributing the sale proceeds’. The approval for 
apportionment is done at a general meeting of the management corporation,33 with 
the rules requiring that the general meeting must be convened before any strata 
owner signs the collective sales agreement.34   
Following this introduction, Part II compares collective sales with compulsory 
acquisitions – while collective sales remain contentious as the law allows a 
supermajority to compel a minority to sell, the section considers whether a 
collective sale is, normatively speaking, not all that different from a compulsory 
acquisition. In Parts III and IV, the aim of the article and the major issues to be 
discussed are articulated. Part V critically examines how the distribution of sale 
proceeds is implemented in NSW and Singapore, while Part VI considers 
weaknesses in both jurisdictions before making a suggestion on a possible method 
of fair apportionment. Part VII concludes.    
 
II COMPARING STRATA RENEWAL WITH COMPULSORY 
ACQUISITION 
It should be noted that the focus of this article is on the fair apportionment of 
proceeds pursuant to a collective sale rather than on the normative merits on 
whether a collective sale should be permitted in the first place. Having said that, 
 
26  Ibid s 176(2). 
27  Ibid s 179. 
28  Ibid s 182(1)(d). See also New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 21 October 
2015, 4639 (Niall Blair).  
29  Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) sch 2 cl 2.    
30  Ibid sch 2 cl 5. 
31  Ibid sch 3 cl 1. 
32  Though there is no prohibition against double-hatting. 
33  The body corporate of all the strata owners: Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 
10A.  
34  Ibid sch 3 cl 7(2).  
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the following is a brief comparison of the termination of a strata scheme by a 
supermajority with compulsory acquisition. Is the former significantly more 
controversial than the latter? Easthope and Randolph explain that the ‘dualistic’35 
nature of ownership in a strata scheme brings with it ‘an inherent tension’ due to 
the ‘paradox’ of simultaneously being ‘individual owners’ of one’s own unit and 
‘collective owners in the same property’.36 Such a conflict of interest is typically 
observed between owners who are seeking to have the strata property collectively 
sold and those who want to remain undisturbed in their homes, regardless the sale 
price. This conflict has been the focus of most commentators.  
In NSW for example, an opposition Member of Parliament has stated that the 
collective sale laws ‘constitute a new exception to indefeasibility of title’.37 
Edgeworth has observed that strata renewal by majority consensus is ‘at odds with 
the general rationale for private property rights, namely that they should be created 
or transferred only with the consent of the owner’.38 In relation to British Columbia, 
Harris has described the dissolution of a strata scheme by a supermajority as a 
taking, or ‘stripping’ of property interests from those who oppose the sale.39 In 
Singapore, Rajah has described a collective sale as ‘tyranny of the majority’.40 
Laudably, Sherry adopts a pragmatic approach – mindful of important urban 
planning goals, she appears accepting of the termination of a strata scheme, though 
only if it results in countervailing gains in housing.41    
It is worth noting, however, that a collective sale of strata property is a form of 
private takings not altogether dissimilar to that of a public takings of land via 
compulsory acquisition. As an incursion to property, both forms of takings lie 
outside the ambit of the common law.42 Thus, it has been said that in both England43 
and Australia,44 ‘compulsory acquisition and compensation for such acquisition is 
entirely the creation of statute’.45 Notwithstanding, all major jurisdictions have a 
form of compulsory purchase and the correctness of such executive power has 
broad acceptance. A collective sale and compulsory acquisition are both urban 
planning tools meant to rejuvenate cities and increase land use efficiency, the main 
difference being that compulsory acquisition is State-led while a collective sale of 
 
35  Lujanen (n 4).  
36  Easthope and Randolph (n 5) 178.  
37  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 October 2015, 4566 (Guy Zangari) 
(‘Strata Schemes Development Bill Second Reading Speech, 20 October 2015’). 
38  Edgeworth (n 6) 1149–50.   
39  Douglas C Harris, ‘Owning and Dissolving Strata Property’ (2017) 50(4) UBC Law Review 935, 944. 
40  KS Rajah, ‘En Bloc Sales: Tyranny of the Majority’ (March 2009) Singapore Law Gazette 3. 
41   Cathy Sherry, ‘Strata Law Overhaul a Step Too Far’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 23 August 
2015) <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/strata-law-overhaul-a-step-too-far-20150823-gj5mz5.html>. 
42  Blackstone said that the common law would not authorise the ‘least violation’ of private property 
notwithstanding the public benefit that might follow, though he was of the view that the legislature could 
compel acquisition: Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 1765) bk 1 ch 
1 135.  
43  Rugby Joint Water Board v Shaw-Fox [1973] AC 202, 214 (Lord Pearson). 
44  Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR 259, 270 [29] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennnan JJ). 
45  R & R Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (2009) 237 CLR 603, 619 [41] (French CJ) (‘R & R 
Fazzolari’).   
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strata property is market-led, albeit State supported. As observed by Pocock, an 
unconditional ‘reliance on the free market does not promote an optimal level of 
land assembly’.46  
No doubt, strata owners seeking a collective sale are typically motivated by 
the expectation of supernormal profits which typically ‘[occur] because the 
maximally allowed built-density of a strata building’ has increased, or upzoned, 
through the years.47 But at least even non-consenting strata owners enjoy the 
financial windfall of a collective sale – the same cannot be said for compulsory 
purchase which is a forced sale at current market value with the State choosing the 
timing of the transaction. Even if not by intentional design, the fact remains that 
compulsory acquisitions ‘generally occur during an economic slowdown when 
public [infrastructure] projects are … introduced to pump-prime the economy’.48 
The compulsory act of taking land in such bearish conditions forces owners to give 
up their properties at a time not of their choosing, when they may not have the 
option of rearranging their financial plans to meet cash flows. Owners may thus 
lose out financially as they can be forced to relinquish their property when land 
prices are low or at a time when it is inconvenient for the owner to vacate their 
property.49 From a utility perspective, a collective sale is also less draconian than 
compulsory acquisition – while a supermajority of strata owners wish to sell their 
land, the land owner in a compulsory acquisition presumably does not. Fair market 
value does not adequately compensate landowners whose land is compulsorily 
acquired because such landowners do not view land and wealth as perfect 
substitutes – if they did, the landowner in question would already have sold at 
market value. Posner and Weyl explain that the heterogenous nature of real estate 
means that a land parcel in the hands of a particular owner will generally yield that 
owner an idiosyncratic value that is on top of the market value.50 
It is also not the case that compulsory acquisition is for necessarily more 
pressing social ends than a collective sale. Sherry remarks that the protection 
afforded to private property from expropriation in the Anglo-Australian legal 
tradition is extremely thin.51 In Griffiths v Minister for Lands, Planning and 
Environment (‘Griffiths’), a 5-2 majority of the Australian High Court held that in 
the compulsory acquisition of native title,52 the justificatory phrase ‘for any 
purpose whatsoever’ in the Lands Acquisition Act 1978 (NT) section 43(1) meant 
that land can be taken solely to enable the Territory to grant such land to another 
 
46  Melissa Pocock, ‘Compulsory Acquisition, Public Benefits and Large-Scale Private Sector 
Redevelopments: Can Australia Learn from the United Kingdom?’ (2014) 19(3) Local Government Law 
Journal 129, 141.   
47  Ti (n 11) 1031.  
48  Bryan Chew et al, ‘Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Singapore: A Fair Regime?’ (2010) 22 (Special 
Issue) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 166, 177.  
49  Robin Goodchild and Richard Munton, Development and the Landowner, an Analysis of the British 
Experience (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1985) 35. 
50  Eric A Posner and E Glen Weyl, ‘Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly’ (2017) 9(1) Journal of 
Legal Analysis 51, 103.  
51  Cathy Sherry, ‘How Indefeasible Is Your Strata Title? Unresolved Problems in Strata and Community 
Title’ (2009) 21(2) Bond Law Review 159, 165–6. 
52  Pursuant to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 24MD. 
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person for private use.53 R & R Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (‘R & 
R Fazzolari’) is another decision of the Australian High Court which on first blush 
appears to contrast Griffiths as it held that approval by a landowner was needed if 
the land was acquired for the purpose of resale.54 However, the Court in R & R 
Fazzolari was interpreting the more restrictive Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) 
section 188 which specifically prevented the Council from acquiring land 
compulsorily without the approval of the land owner if it was being acquired for 
the purpose of resale; such approval is obviated if the land taken is contiguous or 
lies in the vicinity of other land acquired at the same time for a purpose other than 
the purpose of resale. In reaching their decision, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Kiefel JJ declined to answer whether the ‘purpose of re-sale’ must be the ‘sole’, 
‘dominant’ or ‘substantial’ purpose in question. Instead, they held that because the 
‘“other land” acquired’ by the Council was not to be taken at the same time as the 
land in question, approval by the landowner was still needed, thus preventing the 
compulsory acquisition.55 Given the differences in the respective empowering 
legislation between the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) and Lands Acquisition 
Act 1978 (NT), it can be fairly concluded that the ambit of judicial latitude 
permitting compulsory acquisitions seen in Griffiths is not diminished by R & R 
Fazzolari.  
Even in the United States, thought to be the bastion of rights, the Supreme 
Court in Kelo v City of New London held that the city of New London in 
Connecticut was permitted to condemn 15 residential properties and transfer them 
to the pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer, even though there were no immediate plans for 
redevelopment.56 The Court held that although the takings clause in the 5th 
Amendment only permits the taking of private property for ‘public use’, the 
transfer of the acquired land to Pfizer was for legitimate economic development, 
even if the government could not prove that the expected development would ever 
actually happen. In this regard, the jurisprudence in Singapore is similarly 
deferential to the executive. In interpreting the phrase ‘public purpose’ as required 
to justify a compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act (Singapore, cap 
152, rev ed 1985) section 5, the High Court in Galstaun v Attorney-General57 held:  
Government is the proper authority for deciding what a public purpose is. When the 
Government declares that a certain purpose is a public purpose it must be presumed 
that the Government is in possession of facts which induce the Government to 
declare that the purpose is a public purpose. 
Why then do commentators appear to be more accepting of compulsory 
purchase or eminent domain than sale of strata property by a supermajority? One 
possible reason could be that all landowners are subject to the risk of compulsory 
acquisition while only strata owners are subject to the forced sale of a collective 
sale: the issue being that strata owners appear to have less autonomy than that 
which comes with a certificate of title of a non-strata property. However, even this 
 
53  (2008) 235 CLR 232, 243 [29] (Gummow, Heydon and Hayne JJ).   
54  (2009) 237 CLR 603, 631 [93] (Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). 
55  Ibid 636 [115]–[116]. 
56  545 US 469, 487–90 (The Court) (2005).   
57  [1980–1] SLR 345, 346–7 (Chua J).  
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argument may be tepid. An owner’s property rights are determined by the property 
ownership they possess as different types of ownership confer different property 
rights.58 Strata owners can be said to have purchased their property with the 
deemed knowledge that their unit was subject to sale by majority consensus.59 Sale 
by a supermajority can be seen as a statutory covenant which the owner consented 
to. From a bundle of rights perspective, it could be argued that upon reaching the 
requisite majority needed to effect a collective sale statutorily, the legislation 
effectively recasts the rights of possession and ownership in specie replacing them 
with the right to receive a fair apportionment of the collective sale proceeds.    
The foregoing has suggested that if compulsory purchase is an acceptable 
urban planning tool, then by analogy, a collective sale of strata property effected 
by a supermajority may also achieve broader acceptance. Having set this context, 
I next set out the aim of this article, achieving fair apportionment of proceeds vis-
à-vis strata owners in a collective sale.      
 
III AIM OF THE ARTICLE 
Previously, I have discussed the nature of the duty of care imposed on the 
owner’s strata committee empowered to administer the collective sale in NSW (the 
SRC) and Singapore (the CSC).60 Thus far, there is no NSW case law discussing 
the contents of this duty of care in relation to the apportionment of sale proceeds 
– this is due to the fact that collective sales have only just started gaining 
momentum (having been recently legislated) and perhaps more importantly the 
fact that NSW statutorily provides how sale proceeds should be apportioned, thus 
reducing discretion on the part of the SRC in this respect.   
In Singapore, the ‘method of apportioning the sale proceeds is one of [the] 
three factors relevant to the issue of good faith’ expected of a CSC.61 This is 
particularised in the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) 
section 84A(9): 
The High Court or a Board shall not approve an application … (a) if the High Court 
or Board, as the case may be, is satisfied that – 
(i) the transaction is not in good faith after taking into account only the following 
factors: 
(A) the sale price for the lots and the common property in the strata title plan; 
(B) the method of distributing the proceeds of sale; and 
(C) the relationship of the purchaser to any of the subsidiary proprietors …   
 
58  Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57(2) American Economic Review 347, 
354. 
59  At least those who purchased strata units after the collective sale mechanism was enacted. 
60  Ti (n 11).  
61  Ter Kah Leng, ‘A Man’s Home Is [Not] His Castle: En Bloc Collective Sales in Singapore’ (2008) 20(1) 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 49, 90 [116].  
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The jurisprudence in Singapore is clear that the nature of the duty of care owed 
by the collective sale committee is fiduciary in nature.62 In this regard, a sales 
committee has a duty of even-handedness to ensure that the actual proceeds 
received by each strata owner, particularly those who oppose the sale, is fair and 
equitable. In Lim Li Meng Dominic v Ching Pui Sim Sally, it was held that a clause 
which permitted the deduction of various administrative sums from the share of 
the sale proceeds that would otherwise be payable to the non-signatory strata 
owners (but for the fact these owners had not signed the collective sale agreement), 
which had been inserted by one of the sale committee members, affected the 
method of distributing sale proceeds in a manner that lacked good faith. The sale 
was thus set aside even though the sums in question (S$1,000–S$2,000) were 
small.63  
While the method of distributing sale proceeds is one of three factors by which 
a supervisory tribunal will adjudge the duty of good faith expected of a sale 
committee in Singapore, this is not the scope of the article. Sales committees in 
Singapore must work within existing laws in devising a method of apportionment 
that satisfies both the requisite majority as well as the good faith requirement. 
Rather, I consider the legislative framework in NSW and Singapore to canvass 
something more fundamental – potential weaknesses in the current way 
apportionment of sale proceeds are done and suggestions for improvements.     
Unlike the conflict between those who want to sell and those who do not, the 
dualistic nature of being a strata owner also attracts a less apparent conflict – the 
problem of division upon the conclusion of a collective sale. This issue attracts 
conflicts not only between consenting and dissenting owners but also between 
consenting owners inter se due to differences in the types of lots owned. In 
Singapore, a former Deputy Prime Minister has acknowledged that the matter of 
apportionment in a collective sale is ‘one of the most common grounds of objection 
raised by minority owners’.64 In NSW, there has been no case law on this particular 
point yet, though in the very recent case of Application by the Owners – Strata 
Plan No 61299 (‘Strata Plan No 61299’),65 the Land and Environment Court of 
NSW has, in endorsing the collective sale, made an important pronouncement on 
interpreting two sub-sections dealing with the distribution of sale proceeds when 
a strata scheme is terminated. These will be discussed in greater detail in Part V 
below.  
 
62  Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109, 157 [108] (VK Rajah JA for the Court) 
(‘Horizon Towers’). 
63  [2015] SGCA 54, [85] (Leong JA). While the requisite majority was already achieved (~86%), the 
motivation of the sales committee in that case was to encourage all owners to consent to the collective 
sale so as to reduce administrative costs. In Singapore, where 100% of strata owners agree to sell, an 
application to court is not needed: at [10] (Leong JA). This differs from the position in NSW which 
always needs court approval. 
64  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (20 September 2007), vol 83 at col 2028, 
<https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=003_20070920_S0003_T0002> (accessed 7 April 2020) 
(Siew Kum Hong, Nominated Member) (‘Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, 
Singapore, 20 September 2007’). 
65  [2019] NSWLEC 111 (‘Strata Plan No 61299’). 
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Any dispute surrounding a collective sale is essentially a fight between 
neighbours and these contests extort considerable emotional toll66 from the 
litigants, time and money aside. In Sim Lian (Newton) Pte Ltd v Gan Beng Cheng 
Raynes, the Singapore High Court held that en bloc sales will continue ‘to strike 
raw nerves, especially from those who do not view their property as investments 
but as homes to be kept regardless of price’.67 The motivation of this article is thus 
to articulate a defensible method to fairly distribute sale proceeds in a collective 
sale so as to, inter alia, reduce administrative and social costs which ultimately 
culminate in unnecessary litigation. Owners who oppose a collective sale at all 
costs will of course continue to pursue their rights in court – and this is their 
prerogative. It is hoped however that if improved valuation and distribution 
mechanisms pursuant to a collective sale could be conceived, this would satisfy 
concerns of fairness and thus reduce the pool of would-be litigants.         
 
IV THE PROBLEM DEFINED 
One of the stumbling blocks in en-bloc sale is the obtaining of consensus among 
subsidiary proprietors or owners with regard to the sharing of the sale proceeds. 
Subsidiary proprietors or flat owners often have differing opinions as to the methods 
of sharing the proceeds. This has indeed hampered a number of potential en-bloc 
sales. The Bill has not addressed this problem. To facilitate en-bloc sale, the Bill 
should state clearly the method or formula for sharing the sale proceeds.68 
Where there are intentions for a strata development to be dissolved and 
collectively sold to a developer for redevelopment, a key concern among strata 
owners is how the sale proceeds would be apportioned amongst themselves. In 
Singapore, during the introduction of legislation more than two decades ago 
permitting the dissolution of strata property via a supermajority (as opposed to 
unanimity), Teo Ho Pin MP (quoted above), observed that differences in opinion 
concerning the methodology of apportionment have scuttled a number of 
collective, or more colloquially, en bloc sales. These sentiments, one imagines, 
stem from some strata owners feeling that they may be treated less fairly than their 
neighbours. Practically, this may affect a collective sale in two ways – the owners 
as a whole may fail to get the requisite supermajority to effect a sale, or, in the case 
where the supermajority is established, an unsatisfied owner may lodge a protest 
with the Strata Titles Board or the court on the basis that the method of 
apportionment was arrived in bad faith.69 Having a statutory formula for 
apportionment would mean that sale committees would have no discretion in 
 
66  Sim, Lum and Malone-Lee (n 2) 458, 462; Leng (n 61) 50 [3]. 
67  [2007] SGHC 84, [101] (Assistant Registrar Paul Tan). 
68  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 31 July 1998 (n 17), col 620 
(Teo Ho Pin, Member of Parliament). 
69  Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 84A(9)(a)(i)(B). 
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determining what the method of distribution should be and consequently 
allegations of bad faith in that regard would not be sustained.70  
Adding to this complication is the fact that in Singapore, while strata share 
values (the equivalent of NSW’s unit entitlements) are often a factor in the 
allocation of proceeds, there is again no statutory requirement in allocating share 
values to strata units. Instead, Singapore’s Building and Construction Authority 
(‘BCA’) has created a set of guidelines for developers in recommending71 how 
strata shares are to be apportioned – these guidelines have changed over the years. 
For residential strata schemes, this has led to at least three categories of share 
allocations: Old estates (1967–circa 1980) which had no guidance – this led to 
developers typically allocating one share per strata unit, regardless of unit size;72 
middle-aged estates (circa 1980s–2008) which adopted the previous edition of the 
guidelines73 and new estates (2008–present), which have adopted the present set of 
guidelines.74 Intricately, in the current set of guidelines, the BCA also recommends 
different methods of share allocation for residential, commercial and mixed-use 
schemes; some of these afford developers broad discretion in allocating strata 
shares.     
There is thus no fixed method for apportioning strata shares and no fixed 
method for distributing sale proceeds in a collective sale. The Singapore 
Government’s view regarding why a standard apportionment method is not 
statutorily provided for is ‘because there are a multitude of factors to consider … 
including share value, size of unit, market value … it would be very difficult to 
specify one standard method that you could apply to all sizes, designs and types of 
 
70  Of course having a statutory formula for apportionment could reduce collective sales if the supermajority 
of lot owners disagree with the prescribed formula; at the very least however, certainty will be achieved 
and there will be fewer grounds for contention among lot owners.  
71  While described as ‘guidelines’, they are in practice adhered by developers as binding.  
72  See Re Eng Lok Mansion (Strata Titles Plan No 1871) [2006] SGSTB 41. The tribunal noted that while 
the 64-unit Eng Lok Mansion (constructed in 1966) consisted of lots ranging from 118–46 m2, all strata 
units were allocated 1 share value: at [3]–[5]. Interestingly, this was also the method of apportionment 
adopted by the majority of owners and endorsed by the Board, ie each owner received a  share of the 
sale proceeds: at [10], [59]. Conversely, in Re Spottiswoode Apartment (Strata Title Plan No 626) [2007] 
SGSTB 90, all 92-units also had 1 share value (units ranging from 592–1,141 square feet): at [1]. 
However, the Board endorsed the decision of the majority to adopt a 70% by strata area and 30% by share 
value method of apportionment: at [12], [15]. 
73  See Building and Construction Authority (Singapore), ‘Key Changes Introduced in the Building 
Maintenance and Strata Management Act (BMSMA)’ (Policy Document, 2008) Annex A 
<https://www.bca.gov.sg/BMSM/others/Annex_A.pdf>. Under the pre-2008 guidelines, the share value 
for residential units are allotted based on floor area groupings of 100 m2 intervals; ‘the base share value 
is 3 for units up to 100 m2 increasing by 1 for each block of 100 m2 thereafter’: at viii. In Re Parkview 
Condominium (Strata Title Plan No 877) [2003] SGSTB 50, the Tribunal noted that the 1986-built 
development comprised of units ranging from 94 m2 (with a share value of 3) to 163 m2 (with a share 
value of 4): at 1 [1]. The Tribunal in that case endorsed a blended approach to apportionment of sale 
proceeds (combination of share value and floor area): at 5 [19].         
74  Under the current guidelines, the share value for residential units are allotted based on floor area 
groupings of 50 m2 intervals; the base share value is 5 for units up to 50 m2 increasing by 1 for each 
block of 50 m2 thereafter: see Building and Construction Authority (Singapore), ‘Guidelines for Filing 
Schedule of Share Values under the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act’ (Guideline 
Document, May 2008) 3 (‘BCA Guidelines’). 
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developments’.75 This is an unsatisfactory response as this uncertainty was created 
by the State in the first place. If share values are to be considered in the allocation 
of sale proceeds but the allocation of strata shares is in the first place itself not 
determinatively provided for, it is patent that there can be no standard 
apportionment method.  
The Singapore framework thus allows the requisite supermajority of strata 
owners to decide for themselves how sale proceeds should be apportioned. Share 
values (ie unit entitlements), built-in area and even appraisals (including 
combinations thereof) have all been used in Singapore. As noted by the Board in 
Re Flamingo Valley (Strata Title Plan No 1493), ‘there is no one method of 
apportionment which must necessarily be applied in any given case and each case 
before the Board must be judged on its own facts and circumstances’.76 The 
flexibility on the part of strata owners to decide the apportionment method means 
an additional responsibility on the part of the collective sale committee, which 
must manage the valuers and communicate with all owners the appraisal and 
distribution method chosen. Being owners themselves, certain methods of 
apportionment may benefit some members of the sale committee over other 
owners. This is why under the current flexible system, the ideal make-up of the 
sale committee should be diverse, being representative of the various types of units 
in the development. Should there be a statutory method of apportionment, this 
would alleviate one aspect of the committee’s duty and remove an often core 
source of contention from strata owners. The need for a legislative formula is all 
the more pressing considering that there are no prerequisites for the members of 
the sales committee to have any particular set of skills or expertise yet are saddled 
with administering something as complex as the division of proceeds from the 
collective sale.  
The framework for distributing proceeds in NSW is certainly clearer than 
Singapore’s. NSW statutorily provides that the allocation of unit entitlements must 
represent the proportionate value of each unit,77 as certified by a qualified valuer.78 
Further, under the SSD Act section 171(1), it is stated that sales proceeds from a 
collective sale are apportioned among the owners of the lots according to their 
respective unit entitlements, provided that no lot shall receive compensation any 
less than what it would have had it been compulsorily acquired under the Land 
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) section 55. This implies 
that the allocation of unit entitlements also represents proportional shares of the 
common property. Unlike Singapore, therefore, NSW provides how unit 
entitlements are to be allocated to strata units as well as how proceeds from a 
collective sale are to be distributed.    
 
75  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 20 September 2007 (n 64), cols 
2050–1 (Shunmugam Jayakumar, Minister of Law). 
76  [2007] SGSTB 49, [25].    
77  SSD Act 2015 (NSW) sch 2. The unit entitlement must be rounded to an integer.   
78  Ibid ss 90(3)(d), 4(1) (definition of ‘qualified valuer’). 
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Like NSW,79 the developer in Singapore is the party which initially proposes 
the number of strata share values for each unit; the schedule of strata units 
indicating the type of property use, size, unit number, floor and respective share 
value must be filed with the Commissioner of Buildings80 who grants approval for 
the schedule if satisfied that the allocation of strata shares is done ‘in a just and 
equitable manner’.81 Once approved, the share value of a unit is not to be changed 
unless there was an administrative error in the entry,82 in which case the Registrar 
may correct the certificate of title;83 or the share value was obtained by fraud, in 
which case the court may order an amendment.84 The rigidity in permitting changes 
to the allocation of strata share values in Singapore appears consistent with the 
application of the mirror principle. The Torrens system of land registration is 
statutorily provided for under the Land Titles Act (Singapore, cap 157, rev ed 
2004); section 46 of the Act expressly providing for the paramountcy of the 
registered proprietor.85 In turn, the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, 
rev ed 2008) section 4 provides that the Land Titles Act (Singapore, cap 157, rev 
ed 2004) applies, mutatis mutandis, to land registered in any folio of the subsidiary 
strata land register. This means that the State-guaranteed indefeasibility of title 
guaranteed under the Torrens system of land registration also applies to strata 
property. One of the three principles underpinning the Torrens system is the mirror 
principle which encapsulates the idea that the register should reflect the ‘full 
character of the land’,86 ie the totality of rights and interests concerning title.87 As 
mentioned above, a strata owner is the registered proprietor of his or her own unit 
and a tenant-in-common of the common property. The Building Maintenance and 
Strata Management Act (Singapore, cap 30C, rev ed 2008) section 62(1)(b) 
provides that the share value of a lot determines the quantum of the undivided 
share of the strata owner of that lot in the common property comprised in that strata 
title plan. The fact that share values of a strata lot can only be changed in the case 
of a clerical error or fraud is thus internally consistent with the certainty demanded 
by the mirror principle, ie share values represent the undivided share in the 
common property.88 
Similarly, strata title in NSW is of course Torrens title: the SSD Act section 8 
provides that the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) applies to strata schemes, both 
lots and common property. This means that strata property comes with the section 
42 indefeasibility provision of Torrens title. As mentioned earlier, each lot in a 
 
79  Bronwen Leroy, ‘Strata Title, Community Title and Residential Tenancies: Changing How We Live’ in 
Hossein Esmaeili and Brendan Grigg (eds), The Boundaries of Australian Property Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 165. 
80  Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Singapore, cap 30C, rev ed 2008) s 11(1). 
81  Ibid s 11(5). 
82  Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 11(1). 
83  Ibid s 11(2). 
84  Ibid s 11(3).  
85  The relevant section in the Singapore statute is in pari materia with the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 
42. 
86  Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law (Routledge, 10th ed, 2016) 34. 
87  Ibid. 
88  To clarify, a collective sale is defined as the sale of all the (strata) lots and common property in a strata 
scheme: Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 84A(1). 
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strata plan is allocated a unit entitlement based on its value relative to the other 
lots in the scheme. Like Singapore, the unit entitlement also represents that lot’s 
share of the common property.89 Interestingly, however, NSW adopts a more 
flexible position in permitting the court to readjust the allocation of unit 
entitlements if the developer’s initial allocation is unreasonable or has over the 
years, due to urban planning changes, become unreasonable.90 In effect, this allows 
the court to substantively affect how much a strata owner would receive from a 
collective sale since proceeds from a collective sale are to be distributed according 
to unit entitlements. The capacity for judicial readjustment is a double-edged 
sword. While this power allows the court to dispense substantive justice when the 
need arises, it also attracts controversy as property rights in both the relative value 
of the unit as well as the share in the common property may be affected. Arguably, 
this affects the mirror principle aspect of indefeasibility for Torrens title in NSW. 
While there is no published case law dealing with owners discontent with the 
allocation of sale proceeds, it is likely that this will surface in the near future. 
Already, the Land and Environment Court of NSW has made clear that it will 
intervene to adjust the allocation of unit entitlements if there is a conflict between 
what a strata unit would command if it were compulsorily acquired with what its 
original unit entitlement value pursuant to a collective sale would be. Remarkably, 
the Court did so by going beyond the ambit of the Strata Schemes Management 
Act 2015 (NSW) (‘SSM Act’) section 236.91 Having outlined the main problem this 
article tackles, I now turn to analyse in greater detail certain aspects of concern in 
NSW and Singapore, before suggesting what improvements could be considered. 
 
V ANALYSIS OF THE APPORTIONMENT OF SALE 
PROCEEDS IN A COLLECTIVE SALE 
A New South Wales 
NSW’s statutory framework is significantly clearer than Singapore’s as there 
are rules determining how many unit entitlements each lot should be allocated. In 
relation to the distribution of sale proceeds, the SSD Act provides that this is to be 
done in proportion to the relative number of unit entitlements of each lot.92 NSW’s 
collective sale framework requires the preparation of two independent valuations,93 
with each valuation required to determine the market value of the whole of the 
strata property as well as the values of the individual lots within the strata scheme 
with reference to the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 
 
89  New South Wales Land Registry Services, ‘Strata Schemes’, Registrar General’s Guidelines (Web Page) 
<https://rg-guidelines.nswlrs.com.au/strata_schemes>. 
90  Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) s 236. 
91  Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111, [110]. 
92  SSD Act 2015 (NSW) s 171(1).  
93  Ibid ss 170(1)(e), 179(1)(e)(ii); Strata Schemes Development Regulation 2016 (NSW) reg 33(c); Strata 
Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111, [82]. 
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(NSW).94 This is because the rule that sale proceeds are to be distributed 
proportional to unit entitlements is coupled with the requirement that all lots are to 
receive at least fair market compensation value.95    
The recent case of Strata Plan No 6129996 is an interesting decision (and the 
only one so far) which deals squarely with these issues. The facts concerned the 
collective sale of a serviced apartment building known as the ‘Seasons Harbour 
Plaza Sydney’. Significantly, it was the first time that the Land and Environmental 
Court of NSW dealt with an application for an order for a strata renewal plan. The 
substantive issue before the Court was an application for an ancillary order97 to 
increase the unit entitlements of 5 utility lots98 whose market values had become 
greater than the sum attributable to their original unit entitlements. Pain J assessed 
the valuation reports before her and held that the 5 utility lots had values 
significantly higher than the rates applicable to the other lots. As the original unit 
entitlement allocation did not reflect this difference in value between the 5 utility 
lots and the remaining lots,99 the Court found that there was a conflict between the 
requirement to ensure that each lot receive compensation no less than what it 
theoretically would have under compulsory acquisition with the general rule that 
each lot is to receive a share of the collective sale proceeds proportional to its unit 
entitlement. The Court accepted that the requirement that each lot should 
minimally receive compensation equivalent to that of compulsory acquisition is 
mandatory. Pain J thus approved the collective sale by taking a small proportion 
of the unit entitlements of each serviced apartment and car parking lot and 
reallocated these to the 5 utility lots. In this way, the Court held that it was able to 
satisfy both subsections in the SSD Act, sections 171(1) and 182(1)(d).100 
While there was no substantive injustice on the facts, Pain J’s decision is not 
without controversy. In coming to its decision, the Court made an ancillary order 
under the SSD Act section 186(1). The relevant parts read as follows: 
(1) The court may make an order to provide for any ancillary or consequential 
matter (an ancillary order) that it considers appropriate or necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of the order giving effect to a strata renewal plan. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), an ancillary order may include directions 
about the following matters – 
(a) – (d) …   
 
94  Strata Schemes Development Regulation 2016 (NSW) regs 27, 28; Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] 
NSWLEC 111, [82]. 
95  SSD Act 2015 (NSW) s 170(3). 
96  Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111. 
97  Ibid [57]; SSD Act 2015 (NSW) s 186(1). 
98  These were the lots where the cafe, storage, reception, office and gymnasium were; these were provided 
for the benefit of the guests staying in the serviced apartment. A ‘utility lot’ is defined in s 4(1) of the 
Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) as ‘a lot designed to be used primarily for storage or 
accommodation of boats, motor vehicles or goods and not for human occupation as a residence, office, 
shop or the like’. While an office is specifically defined as not constituting a utility lot, the Court grouped 
the office (lot 124) in its collective description of the 5 lots as ‘utility lots’: see Strata Plan No 61299 
[2019] NSWLEC 111, [100].   
99  Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111, [100]–[101].  
100  Ibid [100]–[112]. 
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(e)   the reallocation of unit entitlements among the lots that are subject to the 
strata scheme for a reason set out in section 236 (1) of the Strata 
Schemes Management Act 2015. 
The referenced SSM Act section 236(1) reads: 
(1) The Tribunal may, on application, make an order allocating unit entitlements 
among the lots that are subject to a strata scheme in the manner specified in the 
order if the Tribunal considers that the allocation of unit entitlements among 
the lots – 
(a)   was unreasonable when the strata plan was registered or when a strata 
plan of subdivision was registered, or 
(b)   was unreasonable when a revised schedule of unit entitlement was lodged 
at the conclusion of a development scheme, or 
(c)   became unreasonable because of a change in the permitted land use, 
being a change (for example, because of a rezoning) in the ways in which 
the whole or any part of the parcel could lawfully be used, whether with 
or without planning approval. 
It is interesting to note that the SSM Act section 236(1) does not contemplate a 
scenario where the allocation of unit entitlements has become unreasonable due to 
relative changes in market price: this may have happened in the facts before her 
Honour. We are told that development of the building was completed in 1999101 
and it may well be that the comparative values of certain types of land use could 
have changed since then; the most drastic amendment was made to the café (lot 
120) when the Court almost doubled its unit entitlement from 180 to 358.03 (out 
of 100,000).102 Accordingly, the Court could not rely on the SSD Act section 
186(2)(e). The learned Pain J noted that none of the scenarios permitting an order 
for reallocating unit entitlements under the SSM Act section 236(1) arose. The 
Court said that it is unknown whether the allocation of unit entitlements to the 5 
utility lots was unreasonable when the strata plan was registered (section 
236(1)(a)). As for sub-sections (b) and (c), the Court expressly ruled these did not 
apply as a revised schedule of unit entitlements was not lodged at the conclusion 
of the building’s development (section 236(1)(b)) nor were there any planning 
changes to the lots (section 236(1)(c)).103 Instead, the Court relied on the 
introductory phrase in the SSD Act section 186(1) which states that ‘the court may 
make an order … that it considers appropriate or necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the order giving effect to a strata renewal plan’.104 Pain J thus 
reasoned that while the SSD Act section 186(2)(e) expressly provides for the 
reallocation of unit entitlements for the reasons set out in the SSM Act section 
236(1), her Honour was nevertheless able to rely on the general powers in the SSD 
Act section 186(1) which extended to reallocating unit entitlements.105 This 
reasoning may attract dissension for a couple of reasons. 
First, as a matter of interpretation, a statute should not be interpreted in a way 
that renders the section otiose. In Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting 
 
101  Ibid [2]. 
102  Ibid Annexure A. 
103  Ibid [109]. 
104  SSD Act 2015 (NSW) s 186(1) (emphasis added). 
105  Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111, [110]. 
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Authority, the Australian High Court materially held that a statutory provision must 
be construed in a harmonious way and that a Court must strive to ‘give meaning 
to every word of the provision … [and that it was ] a known rule in the 
interpretation of Statutes that … no clause, sentence, or word shall prove 
superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be 
made useful and pertinent’.106 In the same vein, the High Court in CIC Insurance 
Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd held that the interpretation of a statute is highly 
contextual, rather than merely literal in nature.107 Pain J’s interpretation of the SSD 
Act section 186(1) is more acceptable in the literal rather than the contextual sense. 
If a broader scope of reallocating unit entitlements were available under the SSD 
Act section 186(1) than contemplated under the three grounds stated in the SSM 
Act section 236(1), the SSD Act section 186(2)(e) is effectively rendered otiose. It 
is submitted that the words ‘without limiting subsection (1)’ found in the SSD Act 
section 186(2) merely clarifies that the sub-sections (a) through (f) are not numerus 
clausus.           
Second, as a matter of policy, it is questionable whether the legislation was 
meant to easily allow for the reallocation of unit entitlements beyond the scope 
contemplated under the SSM Act section 236(1). As a matter of general principle, 
Australian law provides ‘a presumption, in the interpretation of statutes, against an 
intention to interfere with vested property rights’.108 In Nintendo Co Ltd v 
Centronics Systems Pty Ltd, a case dealing with intellectual property interpreting 
the Circuits Layouts Act 1989 (Cth), the Australian High Court held that 
unambiguous statutory language is needed to infringe vested property rights.109 
Applying this presumption to the SSM and SSD Acts, it seems unlikely that this 
threshold has been reached. More specifically, I had earlier stated that allowing for 
unit entitlements to be amended by the court may be an affront to the mirror 
principle. Notably, the grounds permitting a readjustment of unit entitlements 
under that section are fairly narrow – unreasonableness in the allocation in the 
strata schedule of unit entitlements because the developer made an initial mistake, 
at the conclusion of a development scheme (in the case of staged developments) 
or because there was a change in planning laws. As the SSD Act section 8 
specifically states that when dealing with inconsistencies between the SSD Act and 
the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), the former prevails, it can be rationalised that 
amendments to the allocation of unit entitlements under the SSM Act section 236 
as provided under the SSD Act section 186(2)(e) is a permitted overriding interest. 
Infringements of the mirror principle should be minimised, thus calling for a 
narrow interpretation of the SSD Act section 186(1). The content of property rights 
for a strata unit certainly includes its relative share of unit entitlements, thus 
auguring against going beyond the scope of the SSM Act section 236(1) in the 
reallocation of unit entitlements. Perhaps the most principled way for Pain J to 
have reached the same conclusion that her Honour would have been if she were 
able to rely on the SSD Act section 186(2)(e) read with the SSM Act section 
 
106  (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381–2 [70]–[71] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).   
107  (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ).  
108  R & R Fazzolari (2009) 237 CLR 603, 619 [42] (French CJ). 
109  (1994) 181 CLR 134, 146 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
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236(1)(a) and conclude that the allocation of unit entitlements among the lots was 
unreasonable when the strata plan was first registered.    
In concluding the analysis of the case, it is noted that the application for 
Seasons Harbour Plaza Sydney to be collectively sold was heard ex parte. While 
support for the collective sale did not receive unanimity, Pain J noted that none of 
the non-consenting owners appeared in the proceedings.110 It thus remains to be 
seen what will happen if there were non-consenting owners resisting the collective 
sale and whether future courts will wholly embrace Pain J’s reasoning in the 
reallocation of unit entitlements.     
    
B Singapore 
Part VA of the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) 
provides that an application for a collective sale is to be made by at least 80% (in 
the case of buildings older than 10 years) or at least 90% (in the case of buildings 
10 years or less) of the subsidiary proprietors of a strata scheme. While the original 
formulation of these sections in 1999 provided that these percentages referred only 
to the respective strata share values, amendments in 2010 were made to ensure that 
the percentages in question must satisfy the given proportions on a share value as 
well as on a floor area basis.111 For a strata building older than 10 years for instance, 
the Act provides states that the sale must be approved by ‘the subsidiary 
proprietors of the lots with not less than 80% of the share values and not less than 
80% of the total area of all the lots’.112 This amendment may be viewed as an 
acknowledgement (or a makeshift solution to the problem) that the allocation of 
strata shares for a particular unit may have a disconnect with the market value of 
the unit.  
While the Act is clear how the supermajority of votes needed is computed, 
there is no statutory formula on how sale proceeds are to be distributed. Rather, 
the Act simply provides that the sale and purchase agreement signed by the 
requisite majority must specify ‘the proposed method of distributing the sale 
proceeds to all the subsidiary proprietors’.113 Because the apportionment method is 
not statutorily provided, it creates an additional point of potential contention 
among owners as it ties the question of sale price with apportionment in a single 
decision. Owners unhappy with the mode of distribution may vote ‘no’ even if 
satisfied with the sale price of the building as a whole. Even if they are otherwise 
satisfied with the quantum of proceeds they will personally receive, they may be 
unhappy if their neighbours appear to be getting a better deal. Such behaviour 
should be avoided, being inimical to the policy objective of urban renewal. If 
subjective discretion in relation to apportionment is replaced by a statutorily 
provided method that is seen as fair, this would better align interests, improve 
efficiency, reduce disagreements and encourage strata owners who want to sell the 
incentive to work together to secure the best price for their strata scheme.  
 
110  Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111, [7]. 
111  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 20 September 2007 (n 64), col 
1996 (Shunmugam Jayakumar, Minister of Law). 
112  Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 84A(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
113  Ibid s 84A(1).   
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In terms of administration of the collective sale, the rules require the Sale 
Committee to submit ‘a report by an independent valuer on the proposed method 
of distributing the proceeds of sale due under the sale and purchase agreement’ to 
all the subsidiary proprietors.114 This is done before the committee makes an 
application to the Board, and a copy of the valuer’s report is also attached in the 
application to the Board. While the statutory intent behind requiring an 
independent valuer to comment on the distribution method is apparent, it is far 
from sufficient to cure the deficiencies inherent in a system lacking a statutory 
method of apportionment. Additionally, the candour expected of the valuer’s 
report has also been criticised. A Parliamentarian has observed that the valuation 
report serves more as a perfunctory attempt to justify the method adopted rather 
than a truly independent and critical evaluation and consideration:115 
Let me just cite the example of a valuation report that I have seen. In this case, the 
report basically set out and described the different methods of apportionment, 
without any critical analysis of the applicability or suitability of each method to the 
development in question. The valuer then proceeded to state its recommendation, 
which just happened to be the method that the sale committee had already chosen. 
The valuer opined, and I quote: 
‘In view of the above methods and having regard to all relevant information, we are 
of the opinion that the 50% share value and 50% strata area method is a fair and 
equitable method of apportionment. We also understand that this method of 
distribution has also obtained the endorsement of more than 80% of the owners in 
the Collective Sale Agreement.’ 
There was no analysis, no explanation, no justification. Just a bald assertion that the 
method in question is a fair and equitable method, with a telling reference to the 
endorsement of the majority owners. No reference to the other methods of 
apportionment recommended by the SISV [Singapore Institute of Surveyors and 
Valuers]. No comparison of the relative merits of each method. No statement as to 
whether this method is more fairer and more equitable than the others, or whether 
any other method would be more fairer and more equitable. Sir, if that is not simply 
going through the motion, I do not know what is. 
The same Parliamentarian also questioned the degree of independence of such 
valuation reports:116 
It does not help that Singapore is small and the industry is small. Everybody knows 
everybody else. A valuer who provides a report that does not meet a marketing 
agent’s requirements will probably not receive any more work from that agent and 
probably any other agent. Bearing in mind the critical role played by marketing 
agents in this entire process, including suggesting and recommending valuers for 
such reports, everyone has a vested interest in not rocking the boat. Indeed, I have 
been told by a minority owner who was in the pro-tem CSC for his estate that the 
marketing agent in his case actually told him that the agents will always ensure that 
their regular surveyors are engaged and that their regular surveyors will always 
agree with their proposed method. Sir, all this simply means that when it comes to 
the single most important issue in an en bloc sale, minority owners are left with 
little protection from the law.      
 
114  Ibid sch 1 cl 1(e)(vi). 
115  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 20 September 2007 (n 64), col 
2030 (Siew Kum Hong, Nominated Member). 
116  Ibid col 2031. 
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While there is no statutory formula for the distribution of sale proceeds, in 
practice most collective sales take guidance from the methods of apportionment 
listed by the Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (‘SISV’). This still does 
not cure the uncertainty given the broad-brush application of the apportionment 
methodology. The SISV Guidelines state that there are four methods of distribution 
‘more commonly used’:117 
1. Based purely on share value 
This may be used when the units are of the same or similar strata/floor areas with 
same or similar share values.  
2. Based purely on strata/floor area 
This may be used when the units are of the same or similar strata/floor areas or the 
unit value rates are similar for various sizes. 
3. Based on a combination of share value and strata/floor area 
This may be used where there are wide differences in the share value and/or 
strata/floor area among the various units. 
4. Based on valuation       
This method may be used when the general attributes of the property are to be 
considered. A valuation is made of a typical unit of each type or category 
disregarding renovations, facing, floor level, etc. All units in the development are 
assumed to be in a fair and reasonable state of repair and maintenance.  
Somewhat irresolutely, the SISV Guidelines also go on to state that, 
‘[a]lternatively, the valuation of the individual units can be carried out, taking into 
account differences in unit size, orientation and storey/level, etc. In the case of 
retail units, the Valuer should also take into consideration the location, floor level, 
frontages, configuration and orientation of the unit’,118 and further, ‘[i]t should be 
noted that besides the normal distribution methods, there may be other variations 
or a combination of the above methods. In all cases, the Valuer should justify in 
the report the recommended approach for the distribution of sale proceeds’.119 
While the SISV Guidelines are intended to help develop ‘best valuation 
practices that meet international requirements’,120 the lack of detail in relation to 
apportionment methodologies has not gone unnoticed. For instance, the SISV 
Guidelines have been criticised for failing to provide recommendations and 
guidelines on when each of the stated methods should be used, leading to sale 
committees ‘inevitably … selecting the method which is most likely to achieve the 
requisite majority to approve a sale’.121 Further, in respect of each of the 
methodologies, there are no detailed recommendations concerning how to apply 
the respective apportionment method in a fair and equitable manner.122  
A statutory formula of apportionment obviates the concerns raised by the 
Parliamentarian. Taking away the discretion of apportionment reduces the 
 
117  Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers, Valuation Standards and Practice Guidelines (2nd ed, 
SISV, 2015) 128–9 (‘SISV Guidelines’).   
118  Ibid 129. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Ibid vi.   
121  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 20 September 2007 (n 64) col 
2029 (Siew Kum Hong, Nominated Member). 
122  Ibid.  
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likelihood of either the majority abusing their position or a minority position 
intentionally holding out. It aligns interests amongst the owners who wish to sell 
while not prejudicing owners who wish to reject a collective sale regardless the 
price. Importantly, disputes regarding apportionment can be avoided. Fairness and 
certainty would be attained and it is thought that the proportion of successful 
collective sales would increase, leading to the important policy that underlies the 
exercise – ‘redevelopment of ageing estates in … land-scarce [Singapore]’.123 As 
the SISV apportionment methods adopted in Singapore refer to ‘strata share 
values’, it is important to explain how strata share values are allocated in Singapore 
– these do not directly correspond to a unit’s value. To add to the complexity, the 
allocation of strata share values in turn depend on the type of property – single-use 
residential developments, single-use commercial developments, or mixed use 
developments. 
  
C Allocation of Strata Share Values 
Unlike the level of certainty afforded by the NSW legislation, the allocation of 
strata shares (equivalent to NSW’s unit entitlements) in Singapore lack precision 
and consistency. This often leads to a disconnect between the strata share 
allocation and property value, and consequently the distribution of sale proceeds. 
The share value of a strata unit represents the proportionate share entitlement 
assigned to each strata unit in the same development. The example given by 
Singapore’s BCA is as follows: ‘If the share value of an apartment unit in a 
condominium is represented by the figure 5/350, then 350 represents the share 
value of all the units in the condominium and 5 is the share value allotted to the 
unit’.124 Section 62 of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act 
(Singapore, cap 30C, rev ed 2008) states that the share value of a lot determines 
the voting rights of that lot’s subsidiary proprietors, the amount of contributions 
that may be levied by a management corporation on the subsidiary proprietor of 
that lot and importantly, the quantum of the undivided share of the subsidiary 
proprietor of that lot in the common property of the strata scheme. 
The basis on which share values are allocated to a particular lot depend on the 
type of strata building it is part of: (i) single use residential developments, (ii) 
single use commercial developments and (iii) mixed developments. Each will be 
considered in turn.  
 
1 Single Use Residential Development 
According to the BCA Guidelines, ‘[i]n a wholly residential strata 
development, the share value (SV) allotted to strata units [are] based on floor area 
groupings of 50 m2 interval in an ascending order as follows’:125  
 
 
 
123  Ibid col 2006 (Alvin Yeo, Member of Parliament). 
124  Building and Construction Authority (Singapore), ‘Strata Living in Singapore: A General Guide’ 
(Guideline, 2005) 3. 
125  BCA Guidelines (n 74) 3 [3]. 
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Floor area (m2) Share Value 
50 and below  5 
51 to 100 6 
101 to 150 7 
151 to 200 8 
201 to 250 9 
251 to 300 10 
and so on  
 
Two observations can be immediately made. First, because the minimum share 
value that can be allocated is 5, smaller units hold a larger proportion of the total 
shares. Second, the floor area grouping intervals of 50 m2 are quite large, meaning 
that units just below or above the interval lines (eg, 51 m2 or 99 m2) are allocated 
the same share value (and by definition hold equal undivided shares in the common 
property) – this can also cause disagreements when seeking to apportion sale 
proceeds pursuant to a collective sale.   
 
2 Single Use Commercial Developments 
In a single use commercial development (eg all strata office or all strata shops, 
etc), the share value is allocated on a floor basis area, though the share value 
allocated to the building as a whole must be in units of 10. The formula given by 
BCA is as follows:126 
Share Value of Strata Unit =           × 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
The example given by BCA involves computing the share value of a 500 m2 
shop and a 1,500 m2 shop in a building with a total floor area of 4,500 m2.127 Using 
the example of a total share value of 100,128 the BCA Guidelines require that the 
share value of each strata unit must be an integer; they compute the share value of 
the two units as follows: 
Share value of 500 m2 shop =  ×  100 = 11.11 ≈ 11 
Share value of 1,500 m2 shop =  ×  100 = 33.44 ≈ 34129 
 
126  Ibid 4 [4.2]. 
127  Ibid 5 [4.3]. 
128  The BCA Guidelines do not explain why 100 rather than 1,000 or 10,000 were chosen. 
129  The BCA Guidelines do not explain this rounding error. See BCA Guidelines (n 74) 5 [4.3]. 
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While perhaps more principled than the allocation of share values in a single 
use residential development, the requirement that the share value of each strata 
unit must be a whole number can lead to rounding differences depending on the 
total share value chosen. For instance, in the above example, if the share value 
allocated to the building by the developer was 1,000 instead of 100, the 500 m2 
shop would have 111 out of 1,000 shares while the 1,500 m2 shop would have 334 
out of 1000 shares. If 10,000 shares had been chosen, this would translate to 1,111 
and 3,334 shares respectively, which would be the most accurate allocation. 
 
3 Mixed Developments    
In mixed strata developments (ie, more than one type of user groups), the 
allocation of share values to each unit is the least prescriptive, being largely 
qualitative. According to the BCA Guidelines, the allotment of share values is to 
be made based on a combination of the floor area of the strata units and the use of 
‘weight factors’ for each type of strata units. The computation of weight factors 
for each user group (eg, residential, shop, office, etc) is based on the ‘share of the 
maintenance costs proportionate to the expected use or benefit each user group will 
derive from or the risk it will contribute to the common property’. The Guidelines 
provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that the developer should consider: 
(a) Total area  
(b) Common area  
(c) Strata area  
(d) Frequency of usage  
(e) Human traffic  
(f) Risk factors (eg, insurability)130   
In coming to an appropriate apportionment of shares, the BCA Guidelines 
recommend that the developer should consult a professional such as a ‘registered 
surveyor, architect, M&E consultant and managing agent in computing the weight 
factors’ and may also consult the BCA before filing the schedule of share values.131 
This flexible, subjective approach means that different developers are likely to 
come to different allocation methods of share values. This is especially true if the 
developer intends to retain some of the strata units on their balance sheet, allowing 
for potential conflicts of interest to arise. 
Comparing the method of allocating shares in a single-use commercial 
development with that of a mixed development also attracts serious queries. The 
list of factors recommended by the BCA Guidelines for a mixed development 
include ‘frequency of usage’ and ‘human traffic’. That is to say, a shop unit directly 
visible from an elevator exit is likely to experience more human traffic than one 
tucked away in a corner of the building; all things being equal, the more visible 
unit should be allocated more strata shares by the developer. Similarly, a shop unit 
on the ground floor should hold more shares than a shop unit of the same size on 
a higher floor since the ground floor unit will have more human traffic than a 
higher floor unit. No doubt, strata shops in a single-use commercial development 
 
130  Ibid 5–6 [5.1]. 
131  Ibid 6 [5.1]. 
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with a good facing or near an entrance/exit will also similarly benefit from greater 
footfall and hence be valued at a higher price. Curiously however, in a single-use 
commercial development however (eg all strata shops), these factors are to be 
ignored, since the BCA Guidelines state that only floor area should be taken into 
account.      
As evidenced in the forgoing, the requirements under the BCA Guidelines in 
respect of apportionment of strata shares for units are lacking and somewhat 
arbitrary. For single-use residential developments, smaller units are allocated a 
disproportionately higher share of the common property with the relatively broad 
floor intervals problematic. There are also internal inconsistencies in the allocation 
of strata shares between single-use commercial buildings and mixed buildings. The 
host of factors that may be taken into consideration in allocating strata shares in a 
mixed building may also make implementation challenging. As share value is 
typically a factor in the distribution of proceeds of a collective sale in Singapore, 
the difficulties in establishing a fair initial share allocation inevitably leads to 
problems when dividing sale proceeds.  
 
VI ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED APPORTIONMENT 
METHOD 
There are potential problems in the way sale proceeds are apportioned in a 
collective sale of strata property in both Singapore and NSW. This predicament is 
more pronounced in Singapore given that there is no statutory formula for the 
allocation of strata shares, and neither is there one for the division of proceeds from 
a collective sale. Fundamentally, as the decision to sell is coupled with the issue 
of apportionment, strata owners unhappy with the latter may simply vote ‘no’, 
hampering the policy goal of urban rejuvenation – the very purpose of allowing 
collective sales. Though the scope of this problem has never been empirically 
measured, the unhappiness caused by the lack of a fair apportionment of sale 
proceeds has been observed by a number of Singapore Parliamentarians.132 
Providing for a statutory method of apportionment would go some way towards 
resolving this aspect of gridlock caused by the problem of an ‘anticommons’, a 
situation where owners effectively exclude one another from taking a share in a 
larger pie because they cannot agree how much of the pie each owner should get.133 
The variability in allocating strata shares for strata units differs across building 
types (single-use residential, single-use commercial or mixed buildings), as well 
as across vintages (when the strata building was constructed). In turn this has led 
to an equally multitudinous array of distributing sale proceeds. The requirement of 
having a valuer comment on the chosen apportionment method is lacklustre, doing 
little more than perfunctory endorsement of the supermajority’s view, potentially 
leading to the views of the minority in this regard being disregarded. It has been 
 
132  See, eg, Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 20 September 2007 (n 
64), cols 2002 (Teo Ho Ping, Member of Parliament), 2027 (Siew Kum Hong, Nominated Member). 
133  See Michael A Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets’ (1998) 111(3) Harvard Law Review 621, 624.  
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observed by the Court of Appeal that ‘bitter acrimony and strained relationships’134 
have often arisen between neighbours in the context of a collective sale exercise. 
Given the reality that collective sales are very likely to remain part of the strata 
framework (whether in Singapore or NSW),135 something as critical as the method 
of apportionment should not be left to the vicissitudes of chance or human nature. 
To better support the policy goals of collective sales and reduce wasteful litigation, 
a statutory model of apportionment that treats all owners fairly is surely needed.  
The position in NSW is preferable to Singapore’s given that there are statutory 
formulae for allocating unit entitlements as well as proceeds from a collective sale. 
This is not to say that the NSW framework is without fragility. The generous 
interpretation of the SSD Act section 186(1) by Pain J in the recent case of Strata 
Plan No 61299136 in reallocating unit entitlements is not uncontroversial. As the 
case was heard ex parte, it remains doubtful that there will be no further 
development of the law in this respect. Apart from stipulating that every lot is to 
receive a sum proportional to the number of unit entitlements it holds, NSW law 
also requires that every lot receive at least its compensation value on a theoretical 
compulsory acquisition basis. On one hand this justice consideration is laudable. 
On the other however, there is a lack of ‘horizontal equity’, a term put forth by 
Phang to refer to treating like cases alike.137 While the lot owner of the café in the 
case appeared to benefit from an almost doubling of unit entitlements, the owner 
ultimately only received the base value for the lot. In comparison, the other lot 
owners have comparatively received a windfall.   
 
A Recommended Method of Apportionment 
The method of apportionment this article proposes is one based solely on lot 
valuations. This is meant to ensure that every lot benefits from any value premium 
on a proportional basis. By value premium, I do not mean that all strata owners 
will necessarily make a profit. Rather, it simply means that the sum is greater than 
its parts. This is a reasonable assumption as it would be highly improbable, if not 
impossible, for a strata unit to be worth more if it were sold alone than if it were 
sold collectively. Even during an economic downturn or should the strata building 
be struck by a calamity, the collective sale of the building gives the new owner a 
valuable ‘option’138 of redevelopment over and above the combined value of all the 
strata units. Rationally, if units were worth more individually than collectively, a 
supermajority would not agree to terminate the strata scheme, as unit owners 
would simply sell their own units. Thus, in the event that the sum of all the 
individual lots in a strata scheme are appraised at $10 million (consisting of 3 lots 
valued at $2 million and 4 lots valued at $1 million) but is worth $15 million 
collectively to a developer, the suggested method of apportionment would hold 
 
134  Horizon Towers [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109, 115 [2] (VK Rajah JA for the Court).  
135  Ti (n 11) 1038.  
136  See Strata Plan No 61299 [2019] NSWLEC 111.  
137  Sock-Yong Phang, ‘Economic Development and the Distribution of Land Rents in Singapore: A Georgist 
Implementation’ (1996) 55(4) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 489, 493.   
138  Joseph T Williams, ‘Real Estate Development as an Option’ (1991) 4(2) Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics 191, 191. 
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that all lots equally receive a 50% premium. This method seeks to ensure that all 
lots enjoy the same percentage premium above the existing market value of what 
their lot is worth individually.139 While this suggestion is simple to implement as it 
does away with any calculations involving unit entitlements or share values, it is 
not without weaknesses and further research, both in the form of theoretical 
analysis and stakeholder engagement.  
A collective sale comprises the sale of all the lots in a strata scheme and the 
common property. A unit entitlement or share value represents a proportional share 
in the common property of the strata scheme and doing away with any reference 
to these may be theoretically unprincipled. Although one possible counter to that 
would be to value the lots and the common property separately, with the division 
of the sale proceeds from the common property in proportion to unit entitlements, 
it would appear difficult, if at all possible, for a valuer to appraise the common 
property separately from the lots.140 At the least however, as provided in both 
NSW141 and Singapore law,142 the distribution of any money and other commonly 
held assets remaining with the Owners Corporation is done in accordance with the 
proportion of unit entitlements of each lot. This mitigates the fact that over the 
years, owners had contributed to the maintenance of the strata building pursuant 
to their respective unit entitlements or strata share values.   
Another implementation problem of the suggested method of apportionment is 
that the factors that should be considered in appraising each lot under the suggested 
apportionment method are not exhaustive. Singapore’s SISV Guidelines are 
equivocal as to the characteristics that should be taken into account when valuing 
lots.143 Apart from size and land use, there are many unique factors that could affect 
a lot’s value including an unobstructed sea view,144 close proximity to a prestigious 
elementary school145 or even ‘lucky’ unit numbers.146 One approach that could be 
adopted is for at least two independent valuers to appraise each lot on an ‘as is 
where is’ basis, taking into account all attributes of the lot – the valuer’s job is 
simply to assess what the ex-ante collective sale or baseline value of each lot is. 
Any other method adopted to value lots individually would necessarily require the 
 
139  Presumably, if the collective value of the strata scheme was not worth more than the lots individual, the 
majority of owners would not agree to sell.    
140  Solving the issue of this ‘common property’ problem is beyond the scope of this article.   
141  SSD Act 2015 (NSW) s 136(2)(f).  
142  Land Titles (Strata) Act (Singapore, cap 158, rev ed 2009) s 81(13)(a).  
143  SISV Guidelines (n 117).   
144  In Shi-Ming Yu, Sun-Sheng Han and Chee-Hian Chai, ‘Modelling the Value of View in High-Rise 
Apartments: A 3D GIS Approach’ (2007) 34(1) Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 139, 
the authors find that based on Singapore data, an unobstructed sea view adds an average premium of 15% 
to the property price: at 152.  
145  In Sumit Agarwal et al, ‘School Allocation Rules and Housing Prices: A Quasi-Experiment with School 
Relocation Events in Singapore’ (2016) 58 Regional Science and Urban Economics 42, the authors find 
that houses within a 2 km radius of a prestigious primary school experience declines of approximately 6% 
when the school relocates elsewhere: at 56.     
146  Research on housing transactions in Auckland, New Zealand between 1989 to 1996 has shown that in 
areas with a relatively high percentage of Chinese households, ‘lucky’ house numbers have a statistically 
significant positive effect on home values: Steven C Bourassa and Vincent S Pheng, ‘Hedonic Prices and 
House Numbers: The Influence of Feng Shui’ (1999) 2(1) International Real Estate Review 79, 88.  
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valuer to artificially exclude certain characteristics of the lot (eg the state of 
repairs). Such adjustments may result in an unsatisfactory valuation. In the context 
of compulsory acquisition, the Land Acquisition Appeals Board in Singapore held 
in Tan Chwee Hor v Collector of Land Revenue that making many adjustments 
would render a valuation arbitrary.147 Similarly, the Appeals Board in P 
Subramaniam and two others, Trustees of the Settlement of V Pakirisamy v 
Collector of Land Revenue cautioned that as adjustments are a matter of opinion, 
the more adjustments the valuer has to make the larger the margin of error.148  
While some details may require refinement, the recommended method of 
apportionment addresses the vital issue of fairness thus ensuring that all strata 
owners share proportionately in the total value of the collectively sold strata 
scheme.        
 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article has considered, from NSW’s and Singapore’s perspective, the 
vexing issue of distributing proceeds in a collective sale of strata property and has 
highlighted both theoretical inconsistencies and practical weaknesses in both 
jurisdictions. Given the pervading need for housing and urban policy goals, 
collective sales will remain as an organic planning tool in the supply of land for 
redevelopment. In NSW, one of the justifications for permitting a collective sale 
by a supermajority given by the Parliamentary Secretary was the ‘great need across 
the Sydney metropolitan area to provide housing’.149 In the same vein, a member 
of the House in Singapore went so far as to state that not providing the enabling 
legislation for a collective sale by a supermajority would ‘not be the responsible 
approach in land scarce Singapore’.150 The growing ubiquity of strata renewals in 
turn portends disputes not only between owners who ‘do not view their property 
as investments but as homes to be kept regardless of price’151 and those who wish 
to sell, but also within owners in the pro-sale camp; disputes may arise as to what 
the appropriate methodology of apportionment should be. It is hoped that the 
suggested ‘valuation-only’ apportionment method contributes towards the search 
for a fair distribution of proceeds in a collective sale of strata property.
 
147  [1999] SGAB 1, [37]. 
148  [1972] SGAB 1. 
149  Strata Schemes Development Bill Second Reading Speech, 20 October 2015 (n 37) 4305 (Ray Williams).  
150  Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Bill Second Reading Speech, Singapore, 31 July 1998 (n 17), col 607 
(Chng Hee Kok, Member of Parliament). 
151  Sim Lian (Newton) Pte Ltd v Gan Beng Cheng Raynes [2007] SGHC 84, [101] (Assistant Registrar Paul 
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